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27 November 1974

REPORT FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
FROM : DDI Management Staff  
SUBJECT : Transferring the FBIS Media Analysis Group  
REFERENCE : DDI memo of 5 September 1974 on Areas of  
Possible Resource Savings in the Intelligence Directorate

Summary

This report responds to your requirement for recommendations on the DCI's proposal of 23 August 1974 that the media Analysis Group of FBIS should be merged with one of the political production offices in this Directorate. In accordance with your instructions, we have received the opinions of FBIS, OCI and OPR (see Annexes A, B and C), reviewed prior studies of this proposal (see Annex D) and sought advice from political intelligence officers in the DDI and at the NIO level. Our conclusion is that you should recommend to the DCI that the media Analysis Group remain within FBIS.

Our principal reasons for taking this position are as follows:

- a. The concern of both OCI and OPR that their offices could not profitably absorb the Analysis Group and that the quality of its product and services would decline in an all-source environment;
- b. The conclusion we have reached that the independence of Analysis Group from its customers contributes significantly to its ability to produce intelligence that they find valuable;
- c. The conviction of FBIS that propaganda analysis is best performed in concert with propaganda collection and that it requires "in house" analytical expertise to guide its efforts to collect this material; and

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d. The practical fact that the [ ] square feet currently occupied by the Analysis Group in Key Building will not be available in Headquarters for the foreseeable future.

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Despite this negative conclusion, several possibilities for improving the utilization of the Analysis Group's products and services and for investigating possible future savings emerged in the course of our inquiry. Briefly, these are:

a. to increase the awareness on the part of propaganda interpreters and political analysts of the capabilities and limitations of each other's organizations by beginning a program of exchange visits between offices;

b. to involve the propaganda analysts more fully in the production of political intelligence by having them contribute feature articles to the DDI's daily and weekly publications based solely on media interpretation;

c. to realize more benefit from the investment made in automating the Analysis Group's extensive files [ ]

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d. to examine whether the advent of such automated systems [ ] will permit some reduction in the personnel required by Analysis Group.

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1 November 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR:  DDI Management Staff

SUBJECT : FBIS Views on the Future of the Analysis Group

REFERENCE : Your memo dated 21 October 1974


The Unique Function of the FBIS Media Analysts

1. The renewed suggestion that a transfer of the FBIS Analysis Group to another Agency component would be more efficient and cost-effective presumably is based on the assumption that the FBIS analyst's function closely parallels or duplicates that of the political analysts in the Agency's production offices and elsewhere in the Community. This is an incorrect assumption; the media analyst performs a highly specialized function that is unique in the government, and is best performed when this function is an integral part of FBIS's basic collection operation. FBIS analysts and Management believe, therefore, that the question being addressed is: "Can the Agency afford the continued specialized services which have been widely utilized throughout the government for more than 30 years?" The following points illustrate the nature of the media analyst's unique contribution.

a. All political analysts from time to time use the media--i.e. public statements as source material in their analyses, but for them the media is only one of many sources. The all-source analyst, frequently working under great pressure and tight deadlines, cannot be a media expert. He cannot be sure whether he has seen a Soviet or Chinese statement in a radio broadcast or newspaper, in an Embassy telegram, or a clandestinely acquired report. It is then that the all-source analyst turns to the FBIS analyst for advice. The FBIS analyst knows not only whether the statement is from the media but can put it in context and perspective. He knows whether it is new, unusual, rare, or routine. Even more importantly, the FBIS analyst also can say with authority what the respective communist media have not said and would be unlikely to say.

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OCI 1317-74  
1 November 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

DDI Management Staff

SUBJECT : Transfer of the FBIS Analysis Group

1. We continue to believe that the FBIS Analysis Group makes a valuable contribution to our work and that if it were integrated into the Office of Current Intelligence, the services it now performs would almost certainly be lost.

--AG provides a distinctive kind of analysis, especially on Soviet and Chinese affairs, which in effect becomes an input for both OCI and OPR. Experience has shown that, whatever the interests or skills of analysts integrated into OCI, the demands of current intelligence soon divert their attention from more specialized tasks.

--Concentration by the AG on one source--foreign media-- means analysts there have the time to consider subjects in depth and to explore more obscure publications. AG analysts are able to "spot" significant articles in the vast amount of unclassified material that is available and call these articles to the attention of OCI analysts who must consider a variety of sources.


--Complex, often abstruse, developments in the principal communist states mean that there are very seldom clear-cut answers to political questions. The existence of a separate group exploring the evidence and speculating on its meaning can provide new insights and challenge premises.

--One of the principal products of the AG, Trends in Communist Propaganda, is essentially unclassified and can, therefore, receive wide dissemination. Past surveys have shown it to be highly regarded throughout the

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Intelligence Community. It would be difficult for OCI to produce a similar publication without including more highly classified information.

--Integration of AG into OCI probably would mean a sharp decline in the quality of FBIS key-word and thematic files. The primary users of these files are obviously FBIS and the AG, but OCI--along with many other elements of the Community and US delegations involved in negotiations--benefits from them. 25X1



As seen from OCI, the problem is how to make better use of the AG's analytic capacity--both its people and its files --without detracting from its varied and valuable services. Three possibilities occur:

- More extensive contact between analysts of OCI and those of AG. There is already a good deal of this, but we could do more, especially by increasing the exchange of personnel for brief tours.
- Access to AG files is now accomplished through informal queries to AG analysts. The SAFE system may offer new prospects for direct access by OCI analysts.
- The NID opens a new avenue for the use of AG-produced political analysis in publications reaching policy-makers. For instance, newspaper items reporting

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world-wide reaction to a major development could be produced in AG, and OCI could work with AG to assure that the items met the style and production deadlines of our principal publications.



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Office of Current Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR:   
Planning Officer, DD/I Management Staff

SUBJECT : OPR and The FBIS Media Analysis Group

Annex C

1. The location of the Analysis Group in FBIS appears illogical and disorderly; i.e., it is an analytical component in what is essentially a service office. In fact, this is a case where bureaucratic untidiness makes for the most sensible use of resources and for the best intelligence production.


2. The Analysis Group has served a specialized, highly useful function for the intelligence community for many years. Its coverage of the media of the Communist states (most notably in the case of the USSR and the East European states, but also the Asian Communist countries, especially North Vietnam) is both thorough and finely focussed upon one key source of intelligence information. Without, we believe, falling into a parochial attitude, it examines the behavior of Communist governments from a unique perspective.

3. The media referred to are highly coordinated and highly patterned in their responses. The mechanism and the expertise which the analysis group has built up over the years for exploiting these media need to be preserved in one way or another. The elimination of the work performed by the Analysis Group would silence or muffle one valuable experienced, analytical voice among the limited number of centers of intelligence analysis in the community. The interchange of opinion and information would be that much poorer, ultimately affecting consumers as well as analysts.

4. Because of the considerations cited in the foregoing paragraphs, there is a good case for separating (but not isolating) propaganda analysis from other forms of intelligence analysis. Propaganda analysts are in a sense analogous to photointerpreters.

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5. However, moving the Analysis Group to OPR would virtually eliminate that separation. It would also have a number of other injurious effects:



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b. OPR's mission is to produce complete in-depth analysis on the national decision-making processes, foreign policy, and internal politics of major foreign countries. The media analysts of the Analysis Group have a more specialized function and their capabilities do not, in general, match this office's mission.

c. The Analysis Group would add [redacted] to OPR's on-duty strength, all in the Soviet/East European and China fields. There would be more of them than there are analysts in these fields in OPR today, and this would create an imbalance in this research-oriented office.

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d. The additional space required for people and their files, which are enormous, is unavailable in OPR's present quarters.

e. There would be an additional administrative burden on this office.

6. If the decision is made, however, to move the Analysis Group to OPR, this office would carry out the instruction in the following manner.

a. It would survey the capabilities of the Analysis Group personnel. The knowledge which we have now of these people suggests that at best a few could

be fully integrated into OPR's in-depth analytical function. This could be done, but only at the cost of harming the Group's existing capacity in propaganda analysis.

b. Because only a few could be fully integrated into OPR's function, this office would almost certainly decide to keep the unit as a separate entity in OPR, performing its particular analytical and substantive guidance functions. (In effect doing what it is doing now, but almost certainly less efficiently.)


7. It is very likely that lessening efficiency over a period of years would lead to lessening demand for the Analysis Group's product, that this in turn would create bureaucratic pressures to reduce the size of the group, and that, over a period of some few years, bureaucratic and resource pressures would compel a reduction of its size to the point where the unique function of the organization would dissipate and eventually disappear.

8. Following are a few suggestions for improved use of the Analysis Group if it remains in its present position as a part of FBIS.

a. Tie its files into an automated storage and retrieval system. Then the material could be used more quickly by individual analysts in other offices.

b. The weekly publication, Trends in Communist Propaganda, could be repackaged with a more attractive format. Articles should be listed on the cover to give readers a quicker means of ascertaining what is in the publication.

9. In fact, FBIS probably should become a unit separate from this Agency, serving the entire government as it does today. Under such circumstances, retention of the Analysis Group in FBIS would be logical because its function could not really be done efficiently separated from FBIS.



Acting Director, Political Research

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SUBJECT: OPR and The FBIS Media Analysis Group

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
30 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

SUBJECT : The Value of Services and Products of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Analysis Group


This responds to your request for an assessment of the intelligence value of services and products of the FBIS Analysis Group. The HSC assessment makes clear the fact that the Analysis Group's products and services are valued highly and provide a major input into the Intelligence Community's analysis of Communist affairs. The highly specialized nature of propaganda analysis and FBIS' long experience with the public media--printed and broadcast--suggests that the propaganda analysis function could not be performed as effectively outside the environs of FBIS.

Our assessment was prepared in the HSC Secretariat. It incorporates the opinions and advice of FBIS users in the Intelligence Community, and the thrust and conclusions of the paper have been approved by the Committee. Your comments, reactions, or requests for additional information should be addressed to the Executive Secretariat, Room 2G40, Headquarters.



Chairman

Attachment:  
Assessment of FBIS  
Analysis Group



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Annex D

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HUMAN SOURCES COMMITTEE ASSESSMENT

SUBJECT: The Value of Services and Products of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Analysis Group

The Central Intelligence Agency's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), in anticipation of pending resource decisions, requested Human Sources Committee (HSC) assistance in obtaining a rating of the value of the services and products of their Analysis Group. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service Analysis Group is composed of a [redacted] staff divided into five branches: Soviet Foreign Affairs, Chinese Foreign Affairs, World Communism, Internal Affairs and Research. The Analysis Group maintains a watch on the radio and press in Communist countries and major Communist parties, distilling and interpreting the content of the media in special reports and servicing requests for research. Their stock in trade is examining current Communist material in the perspective of past radio and press content and behavior---identifying new elements or departures from the norm, defining the import of public statements and propaganda themes, and isolating indications of policy shifts, sensitivities or projected actions.

In preparing this assessment, Intelligence Community consumers of FBIS Analysis Group services and products have been asked to address two principal questions. The first question asks the consumer: What would be the effect on your operations if the Analysis Group's services and products were to be discontinued. The second question asks consumers to rate the value of the products and services of the Analysis Group in terms of: (a) Indispensable; (b) Makes major contribution; (c) Useful as background; (d) Makes minor contribution. (See attachment for sample questionnaire and products and services being rated.)

Conclusions

Based on a review of consumer responses to the questionnaires and follow-up interviews where appropriate, it is concluded that Analysis Group's products and services do provide a major contribution to the analytical efforts of political affairs and foreign policy analysts following Soviet, Chinese and North Vietnamese affairs at the Department of State and CIA. A significant number of State and CIA analysts (approximately 25 percent) have indicated that Analysis Group products are indispensable to their work. Other consumers also attest to the value of the Analysis Group products. Mr. William L. Stearman, head of the

Indochina Section of the National Security Council Staff, in a recent memorandum remarked that he "frequently relied on the 'Trends' and the daily FBIS takes in preparing briefings and other material for the President and Secretary Kissinger."

Our investigations reveal that concerned analysts believe propaganda analysis to be a unique and highly specialized analytical function. The present value of this function appears to be greatly enhanced by the fact that it is totally integrated into the overall FBIS effort. We conclude that the propaganda analysis function could not be performed as effectively outside the environs of FBIS.

The paragraphs which follow present summaries of comments received from consumers of Analysis Group products and services.

Defense Intelligence Agency

Defense Intelligence Agency analysts receive "Trends" and some of the other Analysis Group products on a regular basis, but use such products less than the Department of State and CIA. Since much of the subject matter dealt with in Analysis Group products is concerned with political affairs, it is not surprising that DIA analyst interest would not be as great. DIA analysts concerned with North Vietnamese affairs, however, did indicate that loss of Analysis Group products would seriously hurt their ability to assess North Vietnamese intentions and current views on various situations and world problems. They indicated that most of the AG products made a major contribution to their analytical efforts and that the "Analysis Notes" and "Collations" were indispensable.

Department of State

The INR analyst for Cuba indicates that the "Trends" makes a major contribution to his analytical efforts and that loss of this Analysis Group product would make it very difficult for him to trace and identify Soviet-Cuban developments.

Near East and South Asia analysts state that Analysis Group products make a major contribution to their analytical efforts. These analysts indicate that "Analysis Notes" and "telephonic consultations with AG analysts" are indispensable to their efforts and could not be replaced by embassy reporting or reporting from any other source.

Analysts of Soviet affairs report that Analysis Group's products and services provide them with a major contribution. They indicate that they rely heavily on Analysis Group contributions and that loss of those services and products would weaken their effort. They indicate further that they would not be able to undertake the type of analysis provided and that their coverage of Soviet internal affairs would be adversely affected. Soviet internal analysts indicate that, if anything, they would like to see increased coverage of Soviet internal themes. Soviet foreign policy analysts report that Analysis Group products provide an invaluable input into their analysis and that their work would suffer accordingly if these products were lost. They state further that the Analysis Group's reports have long been valued and frequently are forwarded to principal officers of the State Department as matters of direct interest.

Analysts of North Korean affairs indicate that loss of the FBIS product in their area of specialization would be

disastrous. *Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000700020003-3*  
information. They rely most heavily on "Analysis Notes" and "telephonic consultations" and would appreciate even more "Analysis Notes" on the FBIS wire.

National Indications Center

The Watch Committee of USIB is an all-source operation and relies on all available information to reach meaningful judgments relating to strategic warning. The National Indications Center (NIC), which is the staff of the Watch Committee, considers propaganda analysis as a valuable input to their efforts, particularly in crisis situations. A whole section of the USIB General Indicator List is devoted to propaganda indicators. Propaganda during crisis periods more often than not runs parallel to subtle or concealed military planning for offensive operations. The information provided in "Trends" is essential during periods of crisis as a cross-check on other available indications data. The Indications analysts indicate that in times of crisis the "Trends," "Supplements," "Special Reports," "Analysis Notes," "Collations," and "telephonic consultations" all provide major contributions to their efforts. Indications analysts state their belief that true experience in propaganda analysis is limited to relatively few people in the US Intelligence Community and that more, rather than less, expert analysis in this field would be helpful, particularly in times of crisis.

Current intelligence analysts following Vietnamese affairs rate the products of the Analysis Group as a major source of information. They indicate that the "Trends" and "telephonic consultations with AG analysts" are indispensable to their efforts. The FBIS "Analysis Notes" and "Collations" provide major inputs. Analysts of North Vietnamese affairs indicate that, in following that country, propaganda analysis is critical, and it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to work effectively without the expertise and background provided by the Analysis Group's products. Analysts following Chinese internal affairs report that they rely most heavily on telephonic consultations with Analysis Group analysts. China internal analysts have noticed a decline in the quantity, if not quality, of AG analysis on China in 1973. They indicate that in the past they have looked to FBIS "Trends" for guidance on Chinese internal propaganda themes. Their highly conventional treatment provided so far this year has made these pieces less useful. China foreign policy analysts rate "Trends" as indispensable to their efforts. The information and background provided is "unique, absolutely essential." "Analysis Notes," "Collations," and "telephonic consultations" all provide major inputs. The literature surveyed in "Trends" is particularly useful because it frequently covers obscure publications not translated by other sources.

Soviet analysts report that Analysis Group products provide a major contribution to their analytical efforts. They are pleased especially with "Collations" and "telephonic consultations with AG analysts." "Analysis Notes" provided on the FBIS wire are very useful to them, and they would like to have more. Any cutback, let alone curtailment, would seriously hamper the effectiveness of their ability to deal with Sino-Soviet affairs. The work of the Analysis Group is believed to be indispensable. The Analysis Group consistently has provided a highly useful input into the coverage of Sino-Soviet relations. Of particular value has been the insight provided into Soviet and Chinese propaganda polemics and political relations. OCI does not have the manpower to fully exploit Soviet propaganda. If the AG service was lost, OCI would be forced to divert some of their resources in an attempt to recoup a small portion of the lost intelligence. Propaganda analysis is a vital function, and as such, should not be abolished.

Some current intelligence analysts, especially those following the non-Communist areas of North Asia and Middle East/South Asia countries, indicate that loss of Analysis Group services would have little impact on their daily activities. If Analysis Group products are used at all, they are used mainly as background.

The Chief of the CIA Senior Research Staff stated his view that the propaganda analysis function should remain with FBIS and that the function certainly should not be eliminated. He provided his evaluation that the propaganda analysis contribution has been one of the finest inputs over the years to political analysis and research, and one which rewards the taxpayer most for his expenditure. The process is of necessity totally integrated within FBIS' overall effort--coverage guidance, translation checks, continuity, etc. It could not be transferred without harm. FBIS should be encouraged to do all the special analytical work it can.

The Chief of the China Division of CIA's new Office of Political Research indicates that through the years he has found that FBIS Analysis Group products have made a major contribution to his efforts. "Trends," "Supplements," and "Special Reports and Memoranda" have made major contributions to the analysis of Chinese affairs.

Intelligence officers in CIA's Operations Directorate have less occasion to use the Analysis Group's products. Officers following Soviet affairs find the "Trends" and "Analysis Notes" on the FBIS wire to be very useful. Of particular value are those sections in "Trends" treating Soviet internal developments. Also, the analyses comparing

current Soviet statements or actions with what they did in comparable situations in the past are very useful. Soviet operations officers indicate that they do not have much occasion to consult telephonically with AG analysts, but when they have called on the Analysis Group for service, they find that the Analysis Group can often provide answers when no one else can. Intelligence officers conducting operations research on China find the "Trends" to be a major source for their efforts.

CA officers and those following propaganda and political action operations indicate that Analysis Group products are of extreme value and indispensable to their efforts. They are particularly high on the "Trends," "Supplements," "Special Reports," and "Collations of Propaganda Themes."

National Security Agency

The National Security Agency reports that for the most part Analysis Group products are used by NSA as background and that discontinuation of the service and products, would be inconvenient but would not have a serious impact on NSA operations.

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